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Abstract 
Sybil attack is considered one of the most damaged attack that menace structured p2p overlay networks. It’s the most 
sophisticated node active, used for a variety of illicit activities. A key requirement for these activities is the ability of  such 
malicious user to generate a huge number of node identifiers and possibly choose some of them in order to disrupt availability 
and integrity in such systems. This paper highlights the problem of Sybil attack and presents a Sybil tracking process to deal with 
such problem. 
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1. Introduction 
Structured p2p overlay networks have recently emerged as good candidate infrastructure for building novel large-
scale and robust Internet applications in which participating peers share-computing resources as equals. In the past, 
various systems have been proposed such as Chord, Kademlia, Pastry, and probably more are to come [1]. 
These overlay networks are distributed systems without any centralized control or hierarch ical organization, 
where the software running at each node is equivalent in functionality. A review of the features of recent p2p
applications yields a long list: selection of nearby peers, redundant storage, efficient search/location of data items, 
data permanence or guarantees, hierarchical naming, t rust , authentication, and anonymity. However, these systems 
are vulnerable to malicious nodes called Sybil.  
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In such systems, before join ing the network, every peer must usually generate a user identifier. This  identifier 
uniquely identify node in the overlay. However, the assignment of IDs is usually not controlled enough  since there is 
no barriers to join  the system. Users are  free to join o r leave the network at  any time. Th is allows malicious users to 
perform d ifferent types of attacks against the overlay such as Sybil attack. In this attack, a single user create mult iple 
fake identities and pretends to be multip le, d istinct physical node in the system. 
Sybil attack is considered between the most difficu lt and challenging attacks that plague current structured p2p 
overlay networks. A malicious node may try to break the routing system, or block access to information by 
impeding queries, or part ition the network.  
In this paper, we are interested in tracking and mit igating the use of mass Sybil identities by malicious users. We 
argue that the main goal of these malicious nodes is to increase the power of the attacker by amassing links to honest 
users, thus integrating their identifiers into the routing table o f other peers. There is therefore the need to exp lore 
other mit igation strategies that can be used in combination with disinfection efforts to attenuate the threat of the 
Sybil nodes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as fo llows. Section II presents the related works. In Sect ion III, we describe our 
proposed defense called Sybil tracking process. In Section VI, we give detail about the simulation setup and the 
performance measures we used to assess the effectiveness of our mit igation strategy. Section V concludes. 
2. Related Work 
Structured p2p systems have shown to be notoriously difficult  to protect against Sybil attacks. Various reports 
have been published that discuss and describes the various proposed defenses . In this section, we present an 
overview of techniques reported in the literature for making DHT-based systems resistant to Sybil attack.  
Haribabu and Hota [2] have proposed a technique based on resource testing. The goal is to attempt to determine 
if a number of identities possess fewer resources than would be expected if they were independent. It utilizes puzzle 
methods that exploit communication, storage or computational resource constraints of the participating. In these 
puzzles, the verifier sends a large random value to every other identity it wants to verify. These identities must then 
compute the solution within a constrained amount of time. If an entity has more than one identity it will fail to 
compute the solution within this time. 
Bazzi and Konjevod [3] have proposed a solution wherein every  identity is issued a geometric cert ificate by a set 
of beacons nodes in the network. When a node needs to join the network, it has to present the required certificates 
from beacons. Dinger and Hartenstein [4] proposed an ID based identity registration procedure called self-
registration where an entity calculates its ID by apply ing a hash function on its IP address and port number. Finally, 
it registers the IP with ‘r’ nodes in the system. 
In SybilGuard  [5], authors have proposed a distributed algorithm to limit the entry of Sybil identities into a social 
network, exp loit ing the fact that there are very few trust edges between an honest and a Sybil group in a social 
network. They have designed a protocol in which  the verification of a new entry into the network is done by  
intersection of random routes. SybilInfer [6] offers a decentralized protocol to guard the network against Sybil 
attacks explo iting the fact that a Sybil attack would interfere with the fast mixing property of social networks. 
Yothi and Janakiram [7] have proposed a Sybil monitor associated with every  network node to oversee each and 
every transaction of a node. The given SyMon prevents a Sybil node from targeting honest nodes by moderating the 
transactions involving the concerned node. 
3. Sybil Tracking 
Sybil tracking is the process of detecting Sybil attacks performed by malicious nodes, notifying those, and also 
isolate them. In this section, we mainly concentrate on three steps: Sybil detection, Sybil notificat ion, and Sybil 
node isolation. 
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3.1. Sybil Detection 
The main  idea of the Sybil detection is to introduce monitoring peers within  the overlay, the monitors, which  are 
all controlled by one entity, the coordinator. Positioned in a strategic way, the monitors allow us to gain fu ll control 
over a zone of the overlay. The monitor can supervise the traffic of suspicious nodes and its neighbors. We use the 
Sybil attack to infiltrate the overlay and observe the communication between peers to get a better understanding of 
it. 
3.1.1. Detection Suspicious nodes 
 
The aim here is to infilt rate the overlay with few number of monitor nodes, which seek to detect suspicious nodes 
by inserting themselves in the neighbors of honest user. For this, we need to introduce monitors and make them 
known, such that their presence is reflected in the routing table of other peers. 
The coordinator is able to create thousands of monitors on one single physical machine. We have developed an 
implementation of such coordinator that is able to create detectors and specify for each of them a specific zone to 
connect to. We divided the overlay into zones to achieve accuracy and obtain a more global view. A zone is 
specified by x higher order b its (prefix) of the Id space that is common among all peers. We introduce ʹ  detectors 
into the network; the first n bits are different (prefix of each zone) and the following bits are fixed, they are the 
signatures of our detectors. 
To infiltrate the network and detect suspicious peers the monitor M is implemented in the following steps. First, 
M sends hello message to the neighbor peers in order to poison their routing tables with entries that point our 
monitors. The peer that receive hello  message will add the detector to their routing table. Second, M sends 
FIND_NODE or FIND_VALUE message to locate some random Ids in  the monitored zone. We must ensure that 
random node Ids or random content ids does not exist in the Id space. The normal behavior is to reply with the 
nearest nodes to the queried Id. However, the attacker puts its Id in the response and claims he is the owner of the 
queried Id. By checking who priv ileges the ownership of those non-existent Ids, we can identify suspicious nodes. 
Any node coming to us with those content Ids will be marked suspicious. Finally, M gathers the Ids of all suspicious 
nodes detected and report results to the coordinator. 
3.1.2. Local monitoring 
 
This module detects various Sybil attacks against structured p2p overlay networks and verdicts malicious nodes 
involved in such attacks. Local monitoring starts immediately after the infiltrat ion process and the completion of 
neighbor discovery process. The in filtrated node monitors the messages going in and out o f suspicious nodes and its 
neighbors. 
3.1.2.1. Infiltration process 
 
In order to exp lore the suspicious node detected by the detection process, we place a monitor peer within. The 
key idea in this is to make monitors locally to the target  ID of suspicious node and its neighbors. This enables us to 
overhear all the communication. At the start of the infiltrat ion process, the monitor node introduces itself in the 
overlay in the following two steps: 
Step1: The coordinator initiates and places the monitor node next to the target node (suspicious node) in the ID 
space. 
Step2: Neighbor discovery: A neighbor of a node, M, is any node that lies within  the transmission range of M. As 
soon as a monitor node M is infiltrated, it sends a hello message. Any node that receives the  message and sends a 
reply back to M within a predefined time out will be added to its neighbor list. 
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3.1.2.2. Monitoring process 
 
For a node M to be able to monitor a node S. M must be a neighbor of both S and the neighbors of S. In such 
case, M monitors all the communicat ion of S and its neighbors. It captures information for each message sent and 
received from Ns to S in the fo llowing two steps: 
Step1: When suspicious peer S receives a request from the requester peer, it replies with monitor peer address 
because according to suspicious peer routing table, M is one of the closest peers to the requested ID. 
Step2: When the requester peer learns about the monitor peer, it sends the same request. Thus, the monitor 
receives a copy of all messages for the address space attributed to the suspicious peer S.  
3.1.2.3. Detecting process 
 
In general, the act ivities underly ing a large set of Sybil attacks in structured p2p overlay  networks are comprised 
of the following actions performed by Sybil identities. First, Sybil nodes can drop all the messages received from its 
neighboring nodes, thereby disrupting the network message routing for lookup process as well as isolating some part  
of the network. Second, they can delay all the messages by forwarding lookup to incorrect or non -existent peer. 
Thus it will fail to lookup correct  peer by forwarding requests to malicious peers.  Finally, they can send false 
responses to the messages it receives in order to propagate its own propaganda or send malicious files. Thus it will 
strategically spread the target files in the whole network.  
After the description of different kind of Sybil attacks under consideration, a monitor peer can invoke the 
verification protocol to determine the Sybil nodes: 
1. M saves information from each message going over the link X to S in the following form [T; PQ; HD; PD; P1…Pn]. 
2. M time stamps the information with the deadline d.  
3. M overhears every message going out of the receiver S.  
4. For all messages that S claims has come from X do: 
M lookups the information in the database 
If (the information is found) then 
M verifies the packet information (HD). 
If (the packet information does not match with the packet information in the database)  
M signals that S is a Sybil node.  
      Else (the packet does match) 
M drops that information from the database since the message has been correctly forwarded. 
End If 
   Else (the information is not found) 
M signals that S is a Sybil node. (Drop) 
End If 
If (the information stays in the database beyond d)  
M signals that S is a Sybil node. (Delay) 
 End If 
Fig. 1. The verification protocol. 
3.2. Sybil Notifications and Isolation 
Detection process is only the first step towards protecting the structured p2p overlay networks against Sybil 
attacks. The Sybil notificat ion is used to propagate the notification of detected Sybil to the neighbors and takes the 
appropriate action to isolate them from the overlay. To  achieve the notification and isolation process a monitor node 
M executes the following actions. First, M sends to each neighbor of S an authenticated alert message in the 
following form: (IDm, IDs, HM, M’s public key). Second, each neighbor of S who receives the alert  message 
achieve this three actions: it verifies the authentication of the alert message, marks S as a Sybil node and stores the 
message in an alert buffer to prevent other nodes to accept or forward any message from and to S until S will be 
removed from the overlay. Finally, M proceed to the isolation process. It redirect  all messages coming to S to  other 
nodes, drops all messages forwarded by S, and removes S from its neighbor list.  
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4. Evaluation 
For the evaluation, we use the PeerfactSim.Kom [8] simulator to simulate the chord protocol, indiv idually  
without any protection, and with the approach proposed in the last sect ion. We use a network with a fixed size 
(N=500 nodes) and fixed rate o f Sybil nodes (m=0,2%). We use two scenarios; in the first we use a network without 
any protection. However, in the second we activate the Sybil detection process. We distribute the node s over a 
varied number of zones 0, 2, 4 and 8 to determine the number of monitors to detect and mit igate Sybil nodes. Each 
node generates and publishes their data using an exponential random distribution each 60 seconds during the first 
interval rate. Besides, in the second interval time each node performs a lookup each 60 seconds after the 
stabilization process is over. When a Sybil nodes infiltrate the network and intercept a request, it can  drop, delay  or 
send false response to the requester peer. Fig. 2 shows the time event of the attack without Sybil detection process 
and the attack with Sybil detection process respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Attack without Sybil detection process; (b) Attack with Sybil detection process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. (a) Evolution of the number of monitored peers VS the evolution of the number of detected suspicious peers;  (a) Evolution of the 
number of monitored peers VS the evolution of the number of detected Sybil peers 
Fig. 3.a depicts the evolution of the number of monitored peers vs the evo lution of the number of suspicious 
peers for a 4 zones. However, Figure 3.b depicts the evolution of the number of monitored peers vs the evolution of 
the number of detected Sybil peers. We can notice that the number of monitored peers grows rap idly over t he 
duration of the experiment, which  due to the fact that the number of connected peers to our monitor peers increases 
with the simulat ion time. Also, the number of detected suspicious peers and Sybil peers increases with the Sybil 
tracking  process. The high level o f part icipating  in  the network, make such peers detected and tracked by our 
tracking process. Fig. 3.b demonstrates that approximately 94% of Sybil nodes are detected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. (a) False Negative; (b) False Positive 
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We present next on Fig. 4.a the evolution of the number of false negative en relat ion with the evolution of 
number of suspicious peers. It refers to a failure to detect Sybil peers that are present on a system. Fig. 4.b  
demonstrates the evolution of the number of false positive en  relation with the evolution of number of detected 
peers. It occurs when the detector mistakenly flags an honest peer as being infected.  
In summary, the validation experiments show that our tracking process captures close to 98% of requests, 96% of 
operations and approximately 94% of Sybil nodes. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have introduced a Sybil attack. We have proved that this attack is one of the most dangerous 
attacks that plague current structured p2p overlay networks. It  is employed to target hones t peers and hence subvert 
the system. It can drop all the messages received from its neighboring node, thereby disrupting the network message 
routing for lookup process as well as isolating some part of the network. It can delay all the messages by forward ing 
lookup to an incorrect or non-existent peer. Finally, it can send false responses to the requests it receives to 
propagate its own propaganda or send malicious file.  
Also, we have proposed a Sybil t racking process, which based on three processes to detect and attenuate Sybil 
nodes. The Sybil detection unit is responsible for detecting any kind of Sybil attack described above. The 
notification unit  handles how to notify  these attacks to its neighbors. Finally, the isolation process is responsible for 
isolating them from the overlay. 
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